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[45 C.2d

cannot review mere error on certiorari. (Of. Redlands etc.
Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 348, 360 [125 P.2d
490].)
The orders sought to be reviewed are affirmed.
Shenk, J ., Edmonds, J ., Carter, J ., Traynor, J ., and Spence,
J ., concurred.

[Sac. No. 6601.

In Bank.

Dec. 29, 1955.]

THE CAI,IB'OHNIA OHEGON POWER COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COUHT OF SISKIYOU
COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in
Interest.
[1] Waters- Navigable Waters- Rights of State and Federal
Government.-The field with respect to the maintenance of
dams on navigable streams is not exclusively occupied for all
purposes by the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.)
or the Federal Power Commission; there is a duality of control between the federal and state governments, the extent of
which is not specified.
[2] !d.-Navigable Waters-Powers of State.-While state laws
may not "veto" proJects on a navigable stream which are
licensed by the Federal Power Commission and the giving of '1
license may not be made contingent on the state's consent, that
is, the state may not block the project completely, regulatory
state laws which do not achieve that end are not improper.
[3] !d.-Procedure and Practice-Jurisdiction.-Where the state.
suing to abate a nuisance, has not asked that defendant power
company cease operating its dams across a navigable stream
but asks that they be so operated as not to create a danger
to the public and the destruction of fish, the superior court.
which has general jurisdiction over nuisances and the measures necessary to deal with them, has jurisdiction to try the
action.
[ 4] Administrative Law-Court Review-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.- Where the superior court has jurisdiction
of a suit by the state to abate a nuisance arising out of
[11 See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 524: Am.Jur., Waters, § 196.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 431; [2] Waters, § 432;
l::!, 8J Waters, § 675; [4] Administrative Law, § 13: [5] Waters,
~§ 673, 675; [6, 7] Public Utilities, § 12; [9] Nuisances, § 34.
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~5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

defendant power
maintenance and use of dams
across a
stream, the question of whether the state
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before the Federal Power Commission is not pertinent.
Waters-Procedure and Practice-Remedies: Jurisdiction.In an action by the state to abate a nuisance arising out of
defendant power
maintenance and use of dams
across a navigable stream, the state's intervention in subsequent proceedings before the Federal Power Commission is
not of importance because the question is one of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties cannot grant or exclude such jurisdiction.
Public Utilities-Exclusiveness of Commission's JurisdictionResort to Courts.-While the state Public Utilities Commission
is given broad powers to regulate public utilities by the Constitution and statutes, a superior court has jurisdiction to
abate a nuisance created or maintained by a public utility, and
neither the public utility law nor the Constitution excludes
such jurisdiction.
!d.-Exclusiveness of Commission's Jurisdiction-Resort to
Courts.-The grant of jurisdiction to the Public Utilities
Commission is not exclusive, and until the commission has
acted in reference to any public utility the superior court has
jurisdiction in equity to enforce an obligation imposed by
law on such utility.
Waters-Procedure and Practice-Jurisdiction.-An action by
the state to abate a nuisance arising out of defendant power
company's maintenance and operation of dams across a navigable stream does not call on the court for a legislative
declaration of policy on <;uch subject, but merely presents the
question of what relief may be had for a condition which is
dangerous to the lives of persons as shown by prior drownings
and the destruction of fish.
Nuisances-Abatement-Action by Public Authorities.-The
attorney general may bring an action to abate a nuisance on
behalf of the state and the people.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Siskiyou County from proceeding to try an action.
Writ denied.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison for
Petitioner.
[ 6) See Cal.Jur., Public Utilities and Services, § 19; Am.Ju.,
Public Utilities and Services, § 15.
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Edmund G.
Deputy Attorney General for
Interest.

-'-'""'~-''Juc•cu

W. Ferrier as
Henry Holsinger, Gavin M. Craig and
and Real Party in
Amici Curiae on behalf of
Interest.
CARTER, J.-This is a proceeding in which petitioner, a
public utility and California corporation engaged in the
production and sale of electricity in Oregon and California,
hereafter referred to as defendant, seeks to have the respondent Superior Court in Siskiyou County prohibited from
trying an action pending therein in which the State of California is plaintiff and the power company a defendant.
In its complaint in the above-mentioned action filed in
June, 1950, plaintiff alleged that Klamath River runs through
Siskiyou, Humboldt and Del Norte Counties in California (its
headwaters are in Oregon) and is navigable from its mouth
to its confluence with Shasta River in Siskiyou County; that
it is inhabited by fish, is regularly stocked by plaintiff,
and the fish spawn in its waters; that the fish are the property of plaintiff and held in trust for its people; that about
1917 defendant built two dams, Copco 1 and 2, across the
river at Copco, Siskiyou County, California, which together
with hydroelectric generating plants, it uses to produce electricity; that in so maintaining and using those facilities
defendant controls the natural flow of the river and causes
it to fluctuate suddenly by reducing the flow when it is not
generating power and increasing the flow when power is
being generated; that as a result of such fluctuations large
areas of the bed, banks and bars along the river for 75 miles
downstream from Copco are and have been suddenly and
abruptly uncovered or drained of water when defendant's
hydroelectric plants are shut down, causing about 1,900,000
fish to die; that >Yhen the plants are placed in operation
after a temporary shutdown the result is a "wave front"
causc•d by the sudden release of water which is a danger and
menace to public safety and welfare, indeed, 14 persons have
been drowned in an eight-year period as a result thereof;
that such conduct of defendant constitutes a public nuisance
and defendant has refused to take any action to alleviate it.
In its complaint plaintiff prayed that the nuisance be abated
and defendant enjoined from engaging in such injurious
activities.
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Defendant demurred to the
asserting the court
lacked
It also made the same claim in its answer
after the demurrer was overruled and by way of motion to
dismiss, which motion also sought leave to amend its answer
showing subsequent proceedings before the Federal Power
Commission and to abate the action because of those proceedings. The motion was denied.
Defendant contends that the respondent has no jurisdiction
because (1) the Federal Power Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction under federal law over the location and regulation of dams on navigable streams; (2) plaintiff has failed
to exhaust its administrative remedy before that commission;
(3) the California Public Utilities Commission has exclusive
state jurisdiction over the issues presented; ( 4) plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law and hence is not entitled to
injunctive relief; and ( 5) the subject matter is legislative,
not judicial.
Turning to the first contention, it appears that defendant
never has obtained a license from the Federal Power Commission for its Copco dams. After the action here involved
was commenced and in April, 1951, it filed an application
with that commission to launch Big Bend No. 2 Development
which included additional dams one of which (Iron Gate)
would allegedly ameliorate the fluctuation of the river. In
November, 1951, the commission ordered defendant to show
cause why it should not get licenses for the Copco dams,
whether it was violating the Federal Power Act and other
matters. Thereafter in ,T nne, 1952, plaintiff filed with the
Federal Power Commission a petition to intervene in the
proceedings before the commission and set forth the claims
made by it in its complaint in the action here involved and
asked for relief. Defendant answered plaintiff's petition to
intervene setting forth the pleadings in the state court action.
The commission granted plaintiff's petition. Hearings were
had by the commission in 1952 and in 1954 it ordered defendant to file applications for all its power installations on
the Klamath River because it maintains dams ( Copco 1 and
2) which fluctuate the flow and thus affect navigation and
interstate commerce; it reserved jurisdiction to determine
whether the construction of any regulating dam such as Iron
Gate was necessary to avoid the fluctuation.
The Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.) creates
the Federal Power Commission ( id., § 792). It is empowered
to investigate water resources and the water power industry
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and to issue licenses for the purpose ''of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power
houses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary
or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization
of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other
bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under
its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States . . . . " (I d.,§ 797.) It is" . . . unlawful for any person, State, or municipality, for the purpose
of developing electric power, to construct, operate, or maintain any dam, water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other
works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of the navigable waters of the United States . . . except under and in
accordance with the terms of a permit or valid existing rightof-way granted prior to June 10, 1920, or a license granted
pursuant to this chapter." (ld., § 817.) It may on its own
motion order an investigation of occupancy of, for the purpose of developing electric power, streams over which Congress
has jurisdiction and ''. . . to issue such order as it may find
appropriate, expedient, and in the public interest to conserve
and utilize the navigation and water-power resources of the
region." (I d. § 797 (g).) Licenses may be issued for 50
years and conditioned on all the provisions of the act and
such further rules as the commission may prescribe ; and
licenses may be revoked for the reasons specified in the act
(Id., § 799). Applicants for licenses must submit evidence

that they have complied with the laws of the state within
which the project is located " . . . with respect to bed and
banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water
for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage
in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing
power, and in any other business necessary to effect the
purposes of a license under this chapter." (ld., § 802(b).)
Licenses shall be on the condition that the project will be
such as in the judgment of the commission it is best adapted
''. . . to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing
a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate
or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization
of water-power development, and for other beneficial public
uses, including recreational purposes. . . . (Id., § 803 (a).)
The licensee shall conform to the commission's rules and
regulations "for the protection of life, health, and property"
and shall be liable for damages occasioned to the property
and others by the maintenance and operation of the project.
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§ 803
The United States Attorney General may
on request of the commission ''. . . institute proceedings in
equity in the district court of the United States in the district
in which any project or part thereof is situated for the purpose of revoking for violation of its terms any permit or license
issued hereunder, or for the purpose of remedying or correcting
injunction, mandamus, or other process any act
of commission or omission in violation of the provisions of
this title or of any lawful regulation or order promulgated
hereunder. The district courts shall have jurisdiction over
all of the above-mentioned proceedings and shall have power
to issue and execute all necessary proet>ss and to make and
enforce all writs, orders, and decrees to compel compliance
with the lawful orders and regulations of the commission . . .
and to compel the performance of any condition imposed
under the provisions of this title." (I d., § 820.) And finally,
"Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as
affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with
the laws of the respective States relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation
or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein." (I d., § 821.)
The question thus presented is whether the federal government has occupied the field with respect to the maintenance
of dams on navigable streams to the exclusion of state jurisdiction; there is no question of federal supremacy in the
reg-ulation of navigable streams.
In Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S.
369 [50 S.Ct. 140, 74 I-1.Ed. 483], the New York state court,
in an action for upstream riparian owners, had awarded
damages and injunctive relief against petitioner, a power
company, which had a license from the federal commission
to take water from a federal dam and maintain on the top
of the dam flash-boards to facilitate its diversion. The flashboard raised the water level above the dam to the riparian
owners' damage. The state law made petitioner's conduct
an actionable wrong but it relied on its federal license. The
court held that even though the commission acted within
its jurisdiction in authorizing the project and in the advancement of navigation under the Federal Power Act, supra, such
act " . . . does not purport to authorize a licensee of the Commission to impair such rights recognized by state law without
compensation. Even though not immune from such destruction they are. nevertheless, an appropriate subject for legis-
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Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre
Co., 280 U.S. 369, 377 [50 S.Ct. 140, 74 L.Ed. 483] .) Reference is made to sections 803
and 821, supra, the court stating: ''While these sections are consistent with the recognition
that state laws
the distribution or use of water in
navigable waters and the
derived from those laws may
be subordinate to the power of the national
to
regulate commerce upon
nevertheless so restrict
the operation of the entire act that the powers conferred by
it on the Commission do not extend to the impairment of
the operation of those laws or to the extinguishment of rights
acquired under them without remuneration." (Henry Ford
& Son v. Little E1 alls Fibre Co., snpra, 378.) This was reaffirmed in Federal Power Com. v.
JJlohawlc Powet·
Corp., 347 U.S. 239 [74 S.Ct. 487, 98 L.Ed. 666], where later
cases to the same effect were cited. ·while the court speaks
of private proprietary rights it stresses the sovereignty of
the state.
In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Com.,
328 U.S. 152 [66 S.Ct. 906, 90 L.Ed. 1143], the petitioner
power company applied to the commission for a license to
erect a dam on a navigable stream in Iowa. It did not show
in its application (as required by the Federal Power Act,
§ 802 (b), supra) that it had complied with Iowa's legislation
that a permit from a state agency must be obtained before
any dam could be erected and such erections could only be
under certain conditions. The court held that a showing
of such compliance was not a condition precedent to securing
a license from the federal commission. The court stated the
question was the need, if any, for petitioner to present evidence to the commission that he had complied with Iowa
law (Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A., § 802(b), supra). The
court said ( p. 164) : "To require the petitioner to secure
the actual grant to it of a state permit under . . . as a condition precedent to securing a federal license for the same
project under the Pederal Power Act would vest in the
Executive Council of Iowa a veto power over the federal
project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the effectiveness of the Federal Act. It would subordinate to the control
of the State the 'comprehensive' planning which the Act
provides shall depend upon the judgment of the Federal
Power Commission or other representatives of the Federal
Government.
" [T] he State Code requires that 'the method of construction, operation, maintenance, and equipment of any and all
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dams in such waters shall be
to the approval of the
Executive Council.' This would subject to state control the
very requirements of the project that Congress has placed in
the discretion of the Federal Power Commission. A still
greater difficulty is illustrated by § 7771. This states the
requirements for a state permit as follows:
'' '7771 When permit granted. If it shall appear to the
council that the construction, operation, or maintenance of
the dam will not materially obstruct existing navigation, or
materially affect other public rights, will not endanger life
or public health, and any water taken from the stream in
eonnechon with the project is returned thereto at the nearest
practicable place without being materially diminished in quantity or polluted or rendered deletrious to fish life, it shall
grant the permit, upon such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe.' (Italics supplied.)
"This strikes at the heart of the present project. . . .
''. . . Compliance with state requirements that are in conflict with federal requirements may well block the federal
license. For example, compliance with the state requirement,
discussed above, that the water of the Cedar River shall be
returned to it at the nearest practicable place would reduce
the project to the small one which is classified by the Federal
Power Commission as 'neither desirable nor adequate.' Similarly, compliance with the engineering requirements of the
State Executive Council, if additional to or different from
the federal requirements, may well result in duplications of
expenditures that would handicap the financial success of
the project. Compliance with requirements for a permit that
is not to be issued is a procedure so futile that it cannot be
imputed to Congress in the absence of an express provision
for it. On the other hand, there is ample opportunity for
the Federal Power Commission, under the authority expressly
given to it by Congress, to require by regulation the presentation of evidence satisfactory to it of the petitioner's compliance with any of the requirements for a state permit on
the state waters of Iowa that the Commission considers appropriate to effect the purposes of a federal license on the navigable waters of the United States." With reference to the
power of the state and the United States the court said:
''In the Federal Power Act there is a separation of those
subjects which remain under the jurisdiction of the States
from those subjects which the Constitution delegates to the
United States and over which Congress vests the Federal
45 C.2d-28
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Power Commission with
to act. To the extent of
this separation, the Act establishes a dual system of control.
The duality of control consists merely of the division of the
common enterprise between two cooperating agencies of government, each with final authority in its own jurisdiction.
The duality does not
two agencies to share in the final
decision of the same issue. Where the Federal Government
supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that
the two agencies both shall have final authority. In fact a
contrary policy is indicated in §§ 4 (e), 10 (a), (b) and (c).
and 23 (b). In those sections the Act places the responsibility
squarely upon federal officials and usually upon the Federal
Power Commission. A dual final authority, with a duplicate
system of state permits and federal licenses required for each
project, would be unworkable. 'Compliance with the requirements' of such a duplicated system of licensing would be
nearly as bad. Conformity to both standards would be impossible in some cases and probably difficult in most of
them. . . .
''The securing of an Iowa state permit is not in any sense
a condition precedent or an administrative procedure that
must be exhausted before securing a federal license. It is
a procedure required by the State of Iowa in dealing with
its local streams and also with the waters of the United States
within that State in the absence of an assumption of jurisdiction by the United States over the navigability of its waters.
Now that the Federal Government has taken jurisdiction of
such waters under the Federal Power Act, it has not by statute
or regulation added the state requirements to its federal
requirements. . . .
"[This] brings us to consideration of the effect of the
Federal Power Act upon it and the related state statutes.
We find that when that Act is read in the light of its long
and colorful legislative history, it discloses both a vigorous
determination of Congress to make progress with the development of the long idle water power resources of the Nation
and a determination to avoid unconstitutional invasion of the
jurisdiction of the States. The solution reached is to apply
the principle of the division of constitutional powers between
the State and Federal Governments. This has resulted in a
dual system involving the close integration of these powers
rather than a dual system of futile duplication of two authorities over the same subject matter.
"The Act leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction
subject to the admittedly superior
of the Federal Gov-
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ernment,
interstate and foreign
eommerce, administer the public lands and reservations of
the United States and, in certain cases, exercise authority
under the treaties of the United States. These sources of
eonstitutional authority are all applied in the Federal Power
Act to the development of the navigable waters of the United
States." (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power
Corn., supra, 328 U.S. 152, 167.) And in regard to the effect
of the reservation of state jurisdiction {§ 821, supra) the
court said: "The effect of § 27 [16 U.S.C.A., § 821], in
protecting state laws from supersedure, is limited to laws
as to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water
in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature.
It therefore has primary, if not exclusive, reference to such
proprietary rights. The phrase 'any vested right acquired
therein' further emphasizes the application of the section to
property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to suggest a broader scope unless it be the words 'other uses.' Those
words, however, are confined to rights of the same nature as
those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal
purposes. This was so held in an early decision by a District
Court, relating to § 27 and upholding the constitutionality
of the Act, where it was stated that 'a proper construction
of the act requires that the words "other uses" shall be
construed ejusdem generis with the words ''irrigation'' and
"municipal."' Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283
F. 606, 619.
"This section therefore is thoroughly consistent with the
integration rather than the duplication of federal and state
jurisdictions under the Federal Power Act. It strengthens
the argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus
'saved' to the States, Congress is willing to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural
course." (First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power
Com., supra, 328 U.S. 152, 175.) The First Iowa case waE<
followed by Federal Power Corn. v. State of Oregon, 349 U.S
435 [75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed. 1215], where the federal com.
mission had granted a license to a power company to erect
and maintain a power dam on a nonnavigable stream on
property owned by the United States, with provisions for
anadromous fish. Oregon sought a review of the order for
a license, asserting that the lieensee must have a permit from
it and adequate provision was not made for the fish. It was
held that authorization of the project was within the exclusive
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jurisdiction of the federal commission and the state's consent
was not necessary. In
to the claim that the commission
had not made adequate provision for the fish or the fluctuation
of the natural flow of the river, the court said: ''In this
reregulation of the flow of the stream, the Commission acts
on behalf of the people of Oregon, as well as others, in
to it that the interests of all concerned are adequately protected.
''There remains the effect of the project upon anadromous
fish which use these waters as
grounds. All agree
that the 205-foot dam will cut off access of some fish to their
natural spawning grounds above
dam and that such interruption cannot be overcome by fish ladders. However, the
State does not flatly prohibit the construction of dams that
cut off anadromous fish from their spawning or breeding
grounds. One alternative, thus recognized, is the supplying
of new breeding pools to which the fish can be removed at
appropriate times. The Fish Commission of Oregon has denied
a permit to tl1e Portland General Electric Company to carry
out its present proposal but there appears to be no disagreement as to the underlying principle involved." (Federal
Power Com. v. State of Oregon, rmpra, 832,840 [75 S.Ct.].) In
State of Wash. Dept. of Game v. Federal Power Com., 207 F.
2d 391, certiorari denied. 347 U.S. 936 [74 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.
1087], it was again held that state laws could not entirely
block a project on a navigable stream for which a city in
·washington was seeking from the commission a license to
construct.
[1] Implicit in the foregoing opinions is the concept
that the field is not exclusively occupied for all purposes
by the Federal Po\\·er Act or the federal commission. There
is a duality of control the extent of which is not specified.
[2] \Vhile it is clear the state laws may not "veto" projects
licensed by the federal commission nor may the giving of a
license be made contingent on the state's consent, that is,
the state may not block the project completely, there is nothing
therein indicating that regulatory state laws which do not
achieve that end are not proper. There is nothing said about
nuisances or danger to the public in the Federal Power Act,
and the giving of any remedial relief seems to rest not with
the commission but by court action by the United States
Attorney General on request of the commission. Here we
are concerned with the abatement of a nuisancr, in a sense
a local police measure. The federal commission has not purported to adjudicate that question or do anything about it
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except to
defendant apply for a license for its dams,
Copco 1 and 2, which for many years it has maintained
without any efl'ort to obtain a license and the commission
has done
in regard to the problem. It must be
remembered that the present prohibition proceeding goes only
to the
of the jurisdiction of the Siskiyou County
'l'he state has not even asked in the action
that defendant cease operating its dams; it asks that they
be so operated as to not create the danger to the public and
the destruction of the fish. Being a jurisdictional question
we do not speculate on what the judgment of the Siskiyou
court may be. It may find means to alleviate the alleged
nuisance without substantially interfering with the power
output of the dams. If it has jurisdiction to make any kind
of a judgment in the premises-to afford any relief-then
it has jurisdiction to try the action. It certainly has general jurisdiction over nuisances and the measures necessary
to deal with them. In the First Iowa case, supra, the court
likened the federal commission to the Interstate Commerce
Commission (United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power
Com., 345 U.S. 153 [73 S.Ct. 609, 97 L.Ed. 918] ), hence
Yolo Water etc. Co. v. Sttperior Court, 43 Cal..App. 332 [185
P. 195), is pertinent in its statement that the superior court
could abate a public nuisance by a public utility although
such utilities are subject to regulation by the state Public
Utilities Commission under our Constitution (Cal. Const.,
art. XII, §§ 22, 23 and 23a) and statr (Pub. Util. Code).
The court said (p. 341): "Powers conferred by the constitution upon the Railroad Commission to supervise and regulate public utilities and to bring suits to enforce its orders
and compel public utilities to obey the law is not inconsistent
with the power conferred npon superior courts to entertain
injunction suits instituted by others than the commission
against public utilities. To so hold will not create any conflict
between the courts and the commission, because in all such
suits the courts will be bound and guided and controlled in
all respects in entertaining and deciding or dismissing them
as much by section 23 of the constitution and the Public
Utility Act as by any other provision of the law."
[4] Since the Siskiyou County court has jurisdiction in
the premises the question of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not pertinent. [5] The intervention by plaintiff
in the federal commission proceeding is not of importance
because the question is one of jurisdiction over the subject
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matter and the
or exclude such jurisdiction. Further in
cannot be said that
an adequate remedy at law exists; that
proceedings before
the federal commission, assuming that such is a jurisdictional
question.
[6] There is no merit to defendant's contention that the
state Public Utilities Commission has
over the
subject matter to the exclusion of the
The
state commission is given broad powers to regulate public
utilities by our Constitution and statutes, supra (People v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621
P.2d 723] ), but
the only case which is directly in point on the issues here
present is Yolo Water etc. Co. v. Superior Court, sttpra, where
the court held that a superior court has jurisdiction to abate
a nuisance created or maintained by a public utility and
neither the public utility law nor the Constitution excludes
such jurisdiction. That case has been cited with approval.
(Truck Owners etc., Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 146
[228 P. 19] ; Coast Truck Line v. Ashbury Truck Co., 218
Cal. 337 [23 P.2d 513].) While the discussion in the Yolo
case may be dictum in part, it is persuasive on the point here
involved.
In this same connection defendant claims the instant action
would take water rights it was said to have (fluctuation of
the stream, Moore v. California Oregon Power Co., 22 Cal.2d
725 [140 P.2d 798], with respect to lower riparian owners)
and that a court cannot alter a utility's water rights without
the approval of the state commission, citing Crttm v. Mt.
Shasta Power Corp., 220 Cal. 295 [30 P.2d 30], but those
questions go to the scope of the relief which the court may
give in the action, questions which are not jurisdictional.
[7] Moreover, the grant of jurisdiction to the commission
''is not exclusive, and until the . . . commission has acted
in reference to any public utility the superior court has jurisdiction in equity to enforce an obligation imposed by law
upon such utility." (Miller v. Railroad Corn., 9 Cal.2d 190,
195 [70 P.2d 164, 112 A.L.R. 221].)
[8] Defendant urges that respondent court is without
jurisdiction in that the issues presented in the action are
legislative rather than judicial because the object of the action
is to legislate for the future with respect to the regulation
of hydroelectric installations on navigable streams and to
declare the state's policy in regard to the adjustment of the
competing interests, that is, the preservation of fish and
maintenance and operation of such dams. Reference is made
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to studies
a state
the state Fish and
Game Commission and the Public Utilities Commission a1
the request of the Legislature, dealing with the fluctuation
of the flow of the Klamath River. Reliance is placed on
Werner v. Southern Calif. etc. Newspapers, 35
P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252], Lockard v. City
Los
33 Cal.2d 453
P.2d
7 A.L.R2d 990],
and Wilson v. Walters, 19 Cal.2d 111 [119 P.2d 340]. Those
policy are primarily for
cases say that questions of
the Legislature and it should choose between conflicting polICies. The action does not purport to call upon the court
for a
drclaration of policy on the above-mentioned
subject. It merely presents the question of what relief if
any may be had for the condition which is dangerous to the
lives of persons as shovvn by prior drownings and the destruction of fish. "\Vith respect to the condition, activity or conduct
which may comtitute a public nuisance, the Legislature has
declared that "Anything which is injurious to health, or is
indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the
free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable
lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway is a nuisance." ( Civ. Code,
~ 3479.) "A public nuisance is one which affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance
or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." ( Civ.
Code, § 3480.) '' 'l'he remedies against a public nuisance are :
1. Indictment or information; 2. A civil action; or, 3. Abatement." (Civ. Code, § 3491.) [9] The attorney general may
bring an action to abate a nuisance on behalf of the state
and the people. (People v. Truckee Lbr. Co., 116 Cal. 397
[48 P. 374, 58 Am.St.Rep. 183, 39 L.R.A. 581]; People ex
rel. Roberts v. Beaudry, 91 Cal. 213 [27 P. 610] ; People v.
Glenn-Colusa lrr. Dist., 127 Cal.App. 30 [15 P.2d 549] .)
The alternative writ is discharged and the petition for a
peremptory writ is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J. pro tern.,* concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied January
25, 1956.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

